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Regulations and Brain Drain: Evidence from Wall Street Star Analysts’ Career 
Choices 
 
Abstract 
The Global Settlement, along with related regulations in the early 2000s, prohibit 
the use of investment banking revenue to fund equity research and compensate equity 
analysts. We find that all-star analysts from investment banks are more likely to exit the 
profession or move to the buy side after the regulations. The departed star analysts’ 
earnings revisions and stock recommendations are more informative than those of the 
remaining analysts who followed the same companies. To the extent that star analysts are 
superior to their non-star counterparts in terms of research ability and ability to inform the 
market, the exit of star analysts represents a brain drain in the sell-side equity research 
industry. These results are consistent with the view that the regulations introduced to 
protect equity investors have unintended adverse effects on the investors due to a brain 
drain in investment banks.  
 
JEL classification:  
 
Keywords: analysts, turnover, brain drain, the Global Settlement, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
policy and regulations, investment banks 
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Regulations and Brain Drain: Evidence from Wall Street Star Analysts’ Career 
Choices 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Sell-side analysts from investment banks have long been suspected of issuing overly 
optimistic stock research in exchange for investment banking business, especially during 
the Internet bubble period in the late 1990s (e.g., Becker 2001; Morgenson 2001). 
Regulators implemented a series of reforms from 2002 to 2003 to address the conflicts of 
interest in equity research. One of the provisions of the Global Research Analyst Settlement 
and Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require investment banks to physically separate 
their investment banking and research departments and to restrict interaction between 
them. In particular, banks’ senior management must set the budget of the research 
department without input from investment bankers and without tying the budget to 
investment banking revenue. Investment bankers cannot take part in evaluating analysts’ 
job performance or determining their compensation. Research analysts are prohibited from 
participating in investment banking activities or receiving compensation related to 
investment banking.  
The restrictions imposed in the above reforms have led to a significant reduction in 
the bonuses and total compensation of sell-side analysts. For example, Groysberg et al. 
(2011) show that the median real bonuses for sell-side analysts in a big investment bank 
decreased from $940,007 in 2001 to $450,000 in 2005, although median real base salaries 
stayed roughly at $175,000 during the same period. Such a decrease in compensation may 
cause a brain drain in investment banks and the sell-side research profession if high-ability 
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analysts exit sell-side research to pursue other lucrative opportunities in other industries 
(Institutional Investor 2007; O’Leary 2007; Pizzani 2009). 
In this study, we examine whether star analysts depart from the sell-side investment 
research industry as a consequence of the reforms. Star analysts have been substantially 
affected by such regulations, as they are mostly involved with their firms’ investment 
banking activities and their compensation, especially bonuses, was largely tied to 
investment banking revenue (Krigman et al. 2001; Groysberg et al. 2011). With a 
significant cutoff in their compensation, it is likely that star analysts would exit sell-side 
equity research to pursue other lucrative career opportunities. We treat star analysts as a 
representative group of the best performers in the profession and, hence, we consider their 
departure as evidence of a brain drain in the sell-side investment research industry.1 
Over the period from 1995 through 2007, we find that the percentage of investment 
bank star analysts leaving the sell side increases from 5.1% before the regulations to 11.8% 
afterward. Investment bank star analysts are more likely than their non-star counterparts to 
leave sell-side research in the post-reform period, holding constant the analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, optimism, experience, and affiliation. This result is robust to controlling for the 
confounding effects of the decrease in the investment banking revenue of banks and the 
change in investors’ sentiment. These findings suggest that it has become more difficult 
for investment banks and the sell-side research industry to retain star analysts since the 
                                                 
1 “Brain drain,” a term of British origin, often refers to the departure of skilled professionals who leave their 
native lands to seek more promising opportunities elsewhere (Kwok and Leland 1982). We use this term to 
describe star analysts leaving equity research for other industries. In this paper we focus on the Institutional 
Investor (II) ranking to identify star analysts. The II magazine has published the All-America Research Team 
ranking since 1972. Many prior studies have examined II star analysts. We follow this stream of the literature 
to examine the career choices of star analysts who are considered to be superior in certain dimensions (see 
Section 2.2). We believe that the loss of star analysts who possess superior skills  represents a brain drain to 
the equity research industry. Section 6 discusses empirical evidence consistent with investors valuing the 
research of star analysts more than that of their peers. 
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reforms. To further investigate the loss of investment banking bonuses as an explanation 
for the departure of star analysts, we test whether the reforms have a more pronounced 
effect on star analysts specialized in industries with a high level of investment banking 
activities. We observe that the likelihood and propensity of star analysts to exit sell-side 
research is positively associated with investment banking revenue in the core industry of 
the star analysts.  
The final test of our conjecture involves tracking the career choices of the departed 
star analysts. We document that after the reforms, there is a significant jump in the 
percentage of investment bank star analysts moving to buy-side hedge funds, private equity 
firms, or venture capital firms. In particular, 31.1% of the departed star analysts moved to 
the buy side after the reforms, compared with 24.1% in the pre-reform period. We repeat 
the same set of empirical analyses on a sample of star analysts from non-investment banks, 
including independent research firms, brokerage firms, and syndicate banks.2 As non-
investment banks have no or very little investment banking business, they are less affected 
by the reforms. We do not find an increase in the likelihood of non-investment bank star 
analysts exiting the sell side or moving to the buy side after the reforms. These findings 
provide triangulating evidence that the loss of investment-banking-related bonuses is a 
reason for the departure of investment bank star analysts. 
The departure of star analysts is potentially harmful to the investors who use the 
analysts’ research (Mattlin 2007; Pizzani 2009). We compare the informativeness of the 
earnings forecast revisions and stock recommendations issued by the departed star analysts 
with those issued by other analysts following the same companies or the analysts from the 
                                                 
2  Syndicate bank analysts are only involved in distribution and, hence, face few investment banking 
incentives. The results are unchanged if syndicate bank analysts are excluded.  
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same brokerage firms replacing the departed star analysts. The informativeness of earnings 
forecast revisions and stock recommendations is measured by the short-term market 
responses to these revisions or recommendations. We show that the departed star analysts 
provide more informative research than both benchmarking groups. Specifically, the 
market reacts more positively (negatively) to the upward (downward) forecast revisions 
and recommendation changes issued by the departed star analysts than those issued by 
replacing analysts. We also find that departing star analysts are more likely to issue industry 
recommendations. In addition, the market reacts more positively (negatively) to the upward 
(downward) industry recommendation changes issued by departed star analysts than those 
issued by other analysts. The results are consistent with departing star analysts having more 
industry knowledge. Collectively, these findings suggest that star analysts contribute to the 
informational efficiency of the capital market and that their departure caused by the reforms 
may lead to the loss of the information generated by the analysts from being fully 
impounded into stock prices.3 
We add to the overall understanding of the economic consequences of the regulations 
in the equity research industry. Prior research has shown that these regulations have made 
analysts’ stock recommendations less upwardly biased (e.g., Barber et al. 2006; Kadan et 
al. 2009; Guan et al. 2012) and more consistent with valuation based on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Barniv et al. 2009; Bradshaw 2009; Chen and Chen 2009), and have also reduced 
                                                 
3 Although the buy-side firms that hire the star analysts would trade on the research conducted by the star 
analysts, the informational efficiency of the capital market may be affected. Specifically, if these buy-side 
firms make trades that are not large enough to fully impound the information into stock prices, the stock 
market will become less efficient with respect to the information that is privy to the buy-side firms. Moreover, 
brain drain may benefit large investors and their clients on the buy side (e.g., hedge funds) but certain investors 
(e.g., individuals) who rely on high-quality equity research from sell-side analysts may be harmed. This may 
lead to wealth transfer from small investors to their larger counterparts. Such a wealth transfer effect is implicit 
compared to the direct wealth transfer due to the misleading behavior of some analysts documented in De 
Franco, Lu, and Vasvari (2007).  
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security mispricing (Lee et al. 2014). However, Boni and Womack (2002) and Boni (2006) 
suggest that the reforms cause research departments to reduce their coverage and the 
quality of their research. As Mehran and Stulz (2007) point out, it is important to identify 
and measure all of the costs and benefits to conduct a fair and comprehensive evaluation 
of the regulations.4 In this study, we identify an unintended economic consequence of the 
reforms, namely that the regulations are associated with a brain drain in investment banks 
and the sell-side equity research industry. We believe the brain drain effect should be 
considered in an overall assessment of the efficacy of the reforms.  
This study also contributes to the stream of literature investigating the career 
concerns of financial analysts. Prior studies have shown that analysts’ career outcomes are 
affected by their forecast accuracy, optimism, and experience (Mikhail et al. 1999; Hong 
et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Wu and Zang 2009). We show that compensation is a 
factor that leads to the departure of the best analysts from the sell-side investment research 
profession. Annual pay for top analysts fell to approximately one quarter by 2008 from its 
peak in 2000 (Robinson 2009). We provide systematic evidence supporting the notion that 
the reforms affect the career choices of star analysts when the reforms reduce the earnings 
potential of sell-side analysts. More broadly, our study adds to the labor economics 
literature by demonstrating how regulations and compensation shocks affect human capital 
flows. Deuskar et al. (2011) and Kostovetsky (2017) examine whether good mutual fund 
managers would leave for hedge funds and reach different conclusions. Our study 
contributes to the debate by showing that a brain drain indeed occurs following a 
                                                 
4 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) once joined sanctioned investment banks in seeking the 
removal of the required separation of investment banking and research departments, suggesting that the SEC 
acknowledged the adverse effects imposed on investment banks. The motion was rejected in court (Craig and 
Scannell 2010). See also Brakke (2010). 
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compensation shock in the investment research industry. In the mutual fund industry, good 
managers can be retained by allowing them to manage a hedge fund concurrently (Deuskar 
et al. 2011). Such an alternative may be difficult to find in the investment research industry.  
Section 2 discusses the institutional background and hypothesis development. 
Section 3 describes our sample and data. Section 4 presents our analysis modeling the 
propensity of the star analysts to depart from the sell-side research industry after the 
reforms. Section 5 investigates the career choices of star analysts after leaving sell-side 
research. Section 6 examines the potential loss to investors who rely on the research of the 
departed star analysts. Section 7 provides additional analyses and robustness tests to rule 
out the effect of Regulation FD. Section 8 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Global Settlement and Related Reforms 
The decade of the 1990s is often referred to as the “Age of the Analysts” (Nocera 1997; 
Cole 2001; Hong and Kubik 2003). Both individual investors and institutional fund 
managers relied on the research of financial analysts to trade or generate deals. It was a 
common practice for investment banks to compensate research analysts if they helped the 
banks generate deals through their research. However, growing conflict-of-interest 
concerns led Congress to hold “Analyzing the Analysts” hearings to protect investors from 
losing money as a result of biased research reports (Kane 2002; Hong and Kubik 2003; 
Kadan et al. 2009).  
Following the hearings, regulators implemented a series of reforms to address the 
conflicts of interest in equity research. In May 2002, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC) approved amendments to New York Stock Exchange Rule 351 
(reporting requirements) and Rule 472 (communications with the public) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers’ new Rule 2711 (Research Analysts and Research 
Reports). These new amendments established stringent restrictions on analyst 
compensation, the relationships between research and investment bank divisions, the 
communications with the companies that analysts cover, and personal trading by analysts. 
For example, the amendments prohibit analyst compensation that is based on specific 
investment banking deals or any promise of favorable research for the receipt of business 
or compensation. In addition, the amendments require analysts to disclose all conflicts of 
interest, such as whether they were compensated based on the revenue from investment 
banking divisions and whether their employers received or expected to receive 
compensation for any investment banking services from the companies that research 
analysts cover. All financial analysts must also report the percentage recommendations in 
“sell,” “hold /neutral,” and “buy” categories (Kadan et al. 2009).  
In July 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 501 of 
which also addresses analysts’ conflicts of interest. Investment banks must separate their 
investment banking and research departments and restrict interaction between them. In 
particular, banks’ senior management must set the budget of the research department 
without using input from investment bankers and without tying the budget to investment 
banking revenues. Investment bankers cannot take part in evaluating analysts’ job 
performance or determining their compensation. Research analysts are also prohibited 
from participating in investment banking activities or receiving compensation related to 
investment banking.  
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The SEC further proposed enforcement actions against 10 top U.S. investment banks 
in December 2002 and the Global Research Analyst Settlement was finalized in April 2003. 
The investigations of these sanctioned banks started in June 2001, when many well-known 
research analysts, such as Mary Meeker and Henry Blodget, were criticized for issuing 
favorable ratings that contributed to the stock price crash of Internet companies. All of the 
sanctioned investment banks were found to have had inappropriate influences on their 
research analysts. These investigations ultimately led to sanctions on the investment banks 
and the Global Settlement, including $1.435 billion in penalties and fines. 
Prior studies suggest that these reforms have had a significant effect on the capital 
market. For example, Kadan et al. (2009) document that the overall informativeness of 
analyst recommendations has decreased since the Global Settlement. Sell-side analysts are 
more likely to issue neutral and pessimistic recommendations, which became less 
informative during the post-reform period. Consistent with their findings, Clarke et al. 
(2011) and Dong and Hu (2016) question the overall benefit for investors by showing that 
sell-side analysts are less likely to issue informative recommendations after the reforms. In 
addition, Mahaney-Walter (2015) finds that the Global Settlement causes many investment 
banks to lose their market share in equity issuance. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
The series of conflict-of-interest regulations has significantly reduced the compensation of 
sell-side analysts. Using compensation data from a leading Wall Street investment bank, 
Groysberg et al. (2011) document that median analyst compensation (expressed in 2005 
dollars) declined from the peak of $1,148,835 in 2001 to $647,500 in 2005. Although 
median real base salaries stayed roughly the same ($175,000), median bonuses decreased 
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from $940,007 in 2001 to $450,000 in 2005. This significant drop in compensation may 
cause a brain drain in the sell-side research and investment banking profession if high-
quality analysts leave the sell-side research industry to pursue other lucrative 
opportunities.5 
Star analysts are voted by institutional investors based on a number of features, such 
as industry knowledge, special services, earnings reports, and stock recommendations 
(Bagnoli et al. 2008). Prior research has presented evidence that star analysts are superior 
to their non-star peers. In addition to broader industry knowledge, star analysts provide 
more accurate and timely earnings forecasts (e.g., Stickel 1992; Gleason and Lee 2003; 
Bonner et al. 2007; Leone and Wu 2007). Their status and coverage affect the market share 
of equity offerings of investment banks, and their forecasts suffer less from conflicts of 
interest due to their concerns for their personal reputations (e.g., Dunbar 2000; Krigman et 
al. 2001; Clarke et al. 2007; Bagnoli et al. 2008; Fang and Yasuda 2009).6  
Consistent with the notion that star analysts possess higher ability (or are valued 
more by their employers), Groysberg et al. (2011) find that star analysts receive 61% higher 
                                                 
5 Actual compensation data for both sell- and buy-side industries are not publicly available. Hence, we rely 
on anecdotal evidence and survey data to infer whether compensation is higher on the buy side than the sell 
side. A 2007 CFA member compensation survey (Institutional Investor 2007) suggests that the three highest 
paid positions are portfolio managers ($456,000), investment bankers ($275,000), and sell-side research 
analysts ($195,000). Institutional Investor (II 2007), Investment Dealer Digest (O’Leary 2007), Bloomberg 
Markets (Robinson 2009), and CFA Magazine (Pizzani 2009) discuss a decrease in sell-side analyst 
compensation and expect sell-side analysts to move to the buy side. 
6 We focus solely on Institutional Investor (II) star analysts, who have been studied extensively in the 
literature and are based on votes submitted by buy-side professionals. If their research and services were 
valued by a large number of buy-side professionals, their departure would be a loss to these buy-side 
professionals (i.e., they are the immediate victims of brain drain). The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) publishes 
the “Best on the Street” analyst ranking, which is based on the performance of analyst stock 
recommendations. Emery and Li (2009) examine both the II and WSJ rankings. They find that both rankings 
are largely based on the visibility of the analysts, rather than the performances of their stock recommendations 
and earnings forecasts. Their latter finding is consistent with II putting more weight on analyst industry 
knowledge and special services for buy-side clients than on stock recommendations and earnings forecasts 
(Bagnoli et al. 2008). 
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total compensation and 100% higher bonuses than their unranked counterparts. Although 
higher compensation may simply reflect that star analysts usually take part in their firms’ 
investment banking activities (Krigman et al. 2001), their involvement in investment 
banking activities is an indication that they have certain attributes that are considered 
desirable by both the investment banks and their clients.  
Preventing analysts from receiving bonuses related to investment banking revenue 
is expected to lead to a significant reduction in the total compensation of star analysts and 
may therefore cause them to leave the sell side for other, more profitable opportunities. We 
treat star analysts as a representative group of the best performers in the profession and, 
hence, their departure is considered a brain drain in the sell-side investment research 
profession. 7  However, investment banks can also try to retain their star analysts by 
increasing their compensation, transferring them to another division with higher firm-wide 
bonuses, or promoting them to managerial positions. In this case, we may not be able to 
observe a significant increase in the departure of star analysts from the sell-side investment 
research industry as a consequence of the series of reforms. 
Summarizing the preceding discussions, we state our hypothesis in an alternative form 
as follows. 
Hypothesis: Star analysts who work at investment banks are more likely to exit sell-
side research firms during the post-Global Settlement period than non-star analysts. 
 
3. Sample and Data 
                                                 
7 The II ranking is based on the votes of buy-side professionals. As their research and services are valued by 
a large number of buy-side professionals, the departure of star analysts is a loss to these buy-side 
professionals (the immediate victims of brain drain). 
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Our initial sample comes from the I/B/E/S and covers the period from January 1995 to 
December 2007. We divide the sample period into two sub-periods: the pre-reform period 
(January 1995 to December 2001) and the post-reform period (January 2004 to December 
2007). We examine the effect of the reforms on analysts’ career choices between the pre- 
and post-reform periods. The reforms became effective from 2002 to 2003. In our 
robustness checks, we repeat our analyses, including 2002 and 2003 to the post-reform 
period, and the results are robust.8 
We retrieve all analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendation data from 
Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S database. We use the 2006 I/B/E/S translation file to identify 
the affiliation of each equity analyst and the name of each brokerage firm, which provides 
us with a sample spanning from January 1995 through December 2007.9  
We define an analyst as a star if he/she is on Institutional Investor’s All-America 
Research Team in a particular year or in at least one of the last two years (Soltes 2014).10 
Institutional Investor publishes the list annually in its October issue and the ranking is 
based on the votes of buy-side portfolio managers.  
Our final sample consists of the equity analysts from both investment banks and non-
investment banks. Although the main focus of this study is on investment bank star 
analysts, we use star analysts from non-investment banks to provide counterfactual 
evidence to supplement our main tests. Investment banks are firms classified as investment 
                                                 
8 We discuss our results using different sample periods in Section 7.2. 
9 The I/B/E/S stopped providing the translation file for academic research after 2006. We use the 2006 
translation file to identify analyst affiliations in 2007. Hence, we may lose new investment banks (and their 
analysts) that were added to the I/B/E/S in 2007. For our research question, the effect of including 2007 is 
minimized unless we anticipate new analysts joining the profession, winning the star analyst title, and leaving 
the profession in the same year.  
10 In robustness tests, we redefine star analyst using a one-year or a two-year window (current and previous 
year). Our finding is robust. See the online appendix. 
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banks by Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research and identified as lead or co-lead 
underwriters by Thomson Financial’s SDC database. Non-investment banks include 
independent research firms, brokerage firms, and syndicate banks. Independent research 
firms are firms listed as such by Nelson and are not found in the SDC database as lead/co-
lead underwriters or manager/co-managers. Brokerage firms are firms classified by Nelson 
as major institutional brokers, major or small regional brokers, or investment banks/brokers 
that are not identified as lead/co-lead underwriters or managers/co-managers by the SDC 
database. Syndicate banks are firms listed by Nelson as either investment banks or brokers 
and identified by the SDC database as managers or co-managers, but not as lead or co-lead 
underwriters. Syndicate banks are only involved in distribution of new stocks and hence 
face few investment banking incentives.  
Table 1 reports the number of analysts, investment banks, and companies covered 
each year in our sample period for investment banks. Columns (1) to (3) show that the 
number of investment bank analysts ranges from a high of 3,536 in 2002 to a low of 2,218 
in 1995 and stays at approximately 3,100 from 2004 to 2007. The number of investment 
banks is also quite stable and ranges from a high of 131 in 1999 to a low of 91 in 1995. 
The number of companies covered by investment banks increases from 5,024 in 1995 to 
6,830 in 1998 and then decreases to 4,735 in 2003. It increases gradually afterward. The 
pattern reflects the change of the concentration of analysts following over time.11 
Columns (4) to (6) report the same information for non-investment banks. Although 
there are more non-investment banks than investment banks during the sample period 
                                                 
11 The change in the number of brokers can drive the change in the number of analysts. To rule out this 
possibility, we use a sample with a constant group of brokers in both the pre- and post-reform periods and 
our results are robust (see the online appendix). 
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(1,622 versus 1,446, respectively), the number of analysts from non-investment banks is 
smaller than that from investment banks. As a result, non-investment banks cover fewer 
stocks than investment banks (42,285 versus 72,802 firm-years, respectively). 
 
4. Effects of the Regulations on Star Analysts’ Career Choices 
We examine the departure of star analysts from the sell-side investment research industry 
as a consequence of the reforms. An analyst is identified to have left the sell-side research 
profession in a particular year if he/she made earnings forecasts in that year but stopped 
issuing forecasts the following year, according to data from the I/B/E/S. We further verify 
and confirm his/her departure from sell-side research using Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Research. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics on the number of star analysts by 
year and firm type. This panel also reports the number and percentage of star analysts who 
left the sell-side investment research industry. The number of investment bank star analysts 
increases from 220 in 1995 to 394 in 2003, but starts decreasing afterward and reaches 301 
in 2007. Column (3) shows that the percentage of investment bank star analysts who left 
the industry is less than 8% in the first seven years of our sample period (i.e., the pre-reform 
period), peaks at 14.3% in 2002, and stays relatively high thereafter. Panel B indicates that 
an average of 5.1% and 11.8% of star analysts left the industry during the pre- and post-
reform periods, respectively. In contrast, we observe no change in the percentage of star 
analysts from non-investment banks leaving the sell-side research profession in the post-
reform period. Specifically, column (6) of Panel B reports that 12.5% of non-investment 
bank star analysts left the sell side in the pre-reform period, compared with 12.4% in the 
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post-reform period. Excluding the first three years, which have no star analysts, the 
percentage of star analysts from non-investment banks actually drops from 23.3% to 
12.4%. Overall, these preliminary statistics are consistent with the reforms having a 
differential effect on the career choices of investment bank and non-investment bank star 
analysts.12 
We conjecture that the rise in the percentage of star analysts who left investment 
banks and sell-side research after the reforms may be attributable to the loss of bonuses 
tied to investment banking revenue. We note that Wu and Zang (2009) investigate the effect 
of 76 mergers in the financial industry from 1994 to 2004 on the career outcomes of sell-
side analysts. They find that accurate analysts are more likely to turn over and star analysts 
are more likely to be promoted to executive positions. However, only three, one, and two 
mergers were completed in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. Hence, our results are 
probably not driven by the phenomenon documented by Wu and Zang (2009).13 
4.1 Logistic Regression Analysis of Star Analysts’ Propensity to Exit 
To formally examine the effect of the reforms on the loss of star analysts from the sell-side 
research industry, we use logistic regression analysis to estimate the propensity of analysts 
to exit sell-side research firms. The regression model is specified as follows: 
Pr(LeftSell - Side = 1) = α0 + α1× D + α2×STAR + α3×D×STAR+ α4×TOPACCU 
+ α5×BOTACCU + α6×RFOPT + α7×EXPERIENCE+ α8×BROKERSIZE + α9×NIND 
 + α10×NFIRM+ α11×SANCTIONED + α12×LOGFEE + α13×SENTIMENT + ε, (1) 
                                                 
12 The number of II star analysts varies across years, as the number of industries covered by the magazine 
varies across years. The II magazine does not cover the same set of industries, as some industries go in and 
out of coverage over time.  
13 To rule out the possibility that the decrease in the number of investment banks explains analyst departures, 
we rerun the regressions using a constant sample of brokers over our sample period. The untabulated results 
show that our conclusion is not affected by holding the sample of brokers constant (see Section 7.3 for details). 
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where LeftSell-Side is an indicator variable that equals 1 in the last year that an analyst 
makes a forecast in I/B/E/S and 0 otherwise. D is an indicator variable that equals 1 in the 
post-reform period and 0 otherwise. STAR is an indicator variable that equals 1 for analysts 
who are on the Institutional Investor All-America Research Team in the current year or in 
at least one of the last two years and 0 otherwise.14 
Equation (1) is a difference-in-differences regression model, which is used to 
address potential confounding time effects that affect all analysts. In particular, it allows 
us to compare the change in the propensity of star analysts to leave sell-side research in the 
post-reform period with that of their non-star counterparts. The positive coefficient of 
D×STAR, the difference-in-differences estimate, is consistent with star analysts exhibiting 
a larger increase, relative to their non-star peers, in their propensity to leave the sell side in 
the post-reform period.  
We control for other factors that may affect the propensity of analysts to leave the 
sell-side research industry. Mikhail et al. (1999) and Hong et al. (2000) find that forecast 
accuracy and experience are associated with job separation. Hong and Kubik (2003) also 
show that forecast optimism affects job separation, especially for analysts who cover stocks 
underwritten by their firms. Hence, we control for annual earnings forecast accuracy, 
forecast optimism, and forecast experience in the logistic regression.  
In particular, accurate forecasters may leave the industry for other lucrative 
opportunities and poorly performing analysts may be fired. Following Hong and Kubik 
(2003) and Wu and Zang (2009), we include TOPACCU and BOTACCU in the logistic 
regression. TOPACCU (BOTACCU) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst’s 
                                                 
14 Our results are robust if we define the leaving year as the first year that an analyst does not have a forecast 
in I/B/E/S (see the online Appendix). 
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relative forecast accuracy score is in the top 10% (bottom 10%) of all analysts and 0 
otherwise. Similar to these studies, we measure relative forecast accuracy for each analyst 
i as the analyst’s average forecast accuracy in year t, 
itAccuracy . itAccuracy  is computed 
by averaging ijtAccuracy  across all companies followed by analyst i in period t: 
1
100 100 ,
1
ijt
ijt
jt
Rank
Accuracy
NumberFollowing
  
   
  
  
where ijtRank  
is analyst i’s forecast accuracy rank for company j in period t. 
jtNumberFollowing  
is the number of analysts following company j in period t. We use the 
last forecast made by each analyst for the same company and forecast period. By 
construction, this measure controls for differences in the composition of companies 
followed by the analysts and for differences in the forecasting period. 
We calculate the relative annual forecast optimism, RFOPT, as in Cowen et al. 
(2006), using the following equation: 
,
( )
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where 
t k
ijtFORECAST

 
is analysts i’s forecast of company j’s performance for period t, as 
of t-k. t k
jtFORECAST

 
and ( )
t k
jtSTDDEV FORECAST

 
are, respectively, the average and 
standard deviation of all forecasts for company j and period t, as of t-k.15 We only compute 
t k
ijtRFOPT

 for companies that are followed by at least three analysts, and we only use the 
first forecast made by each analyst for the same company and forecast period. 
t k
ijtRFOPT

 
                                                 
15 We winsorize forecast optimism at the 1st and 99th percentiles, as some standard deviations (i.e., the 
deflator) are extremely small. The results are qualitatively similar if we scale this measure by stock price.  
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is then averaged across all companies followed by analyst i in period t to compute analyst 
i’s average relative forecast optimism at period t, t k
itRFOPT
 . By construction, this measure 
controls for company- and time-specific factors that affect forecast optimism across 
analysts. 
Analyst experience, EXPERIENCE, is the average number of years an analyst has 
issued earnings forecasts or recommendations for the companies he/she follows. Broker 
size, BROKERSIZE, is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the 
sell-size firm. NIND is the natural logarithm of the number of two-digit SIC industries that 
the analyst follows. NFIRM is the natural logarithm of the number of firms the analyst 
follows. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable that equals 1 for analysts affiliated with a 
sanctioned investment bank and 0 otherwise.16 The reforms target these sanctioned banks, 
so analysts from these banks may react to the reforms differently as a result of their 
visibility.  
Two confounding factors may also explain the brain drain phenomenon. First, 
investment banks faced decreasing performance in the post-reform period, as the 
profitability of their trading division was adversely affected by a decrease in soft dollar 
arrangements, trading volumes, and commission rates (Goldstein et al. 2009). As a result, 
bonuses tied to firm-wide profit were adversely affected, making it difficult to use firm-
wide bonuses to retain star analysts. Second, investor sentiment varies substantially in our 
                                                 
16  The sanctioned investment banks include Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank 
Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J.P. Morgan Securities, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup Global Markets (formerly Salomon Smith Barney), UBS Warburg, U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, 
and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC. Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC. joined 
the Global Settlement in 2004 (SEC 2004).  
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sample period (Cen et al. 2013). The sentiment affects trading commissions, which in turn 
may lead to the brain drain phenomenon (Groysberg et al. 2011).  
We control for these two factors by including LOGFEE and SENTIMENT in the 
logistic regressions. LOGFEE is a firm’s investment banking revenue from participating 
in initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned equity offering (SEO) businesses. In 
particular, we collect the fee proceeds for each SEO or IPO issuance and the names of its 
book runner, and all other managers from the SDC database. We then manually match the 
broker names to our sample. If the broker is the book runner of the issuance, we assume 
that the broker takes all of the fee proceeds. If the broker is one of the other managers for 
the issuance, we assume that the broker takes 50% of the fee proceeds. The results are 
robust if we include the fee proceeds for the book runner only. SENTIMENT is the lagged 
value of Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) annual index.  
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 present summary statistics for the explanatory 
variables of the logistic regression for the sample of investment bank analysts and the 
subsample of star analysts by sub-period. In both sub-periods, approximately 13% of all of 
the analysts are star analysts. The average TOPACCU is approximately 10% in both sub-
periods for all of the analysts in the sample, but less than 10% for the star analyst 
subsample. This result is consistent with forecast accuracy not being a main factor in the 
ranking criteria of star analysts (Bagnoli et al. 2008). The mean and median of relative 
forecast optimism, RFOPT, of all investment bank analysts is -0.01, lower than that of star 
analysts in the pre-reform period. In the post-reform period, the relative forecast optimism 
of star analysts is reduced and becomes the same as that of all of the investment bank 
analysts. In terms of experience, the mean experience of star analysts is approximately 13.0 
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years in the pre- and 16.7 years in post-reform period, much greater than that of all of the 
investment bank analysts, which is approximately 10 years. The majority of the star 
analysts are from the 12 sanctioned investment banks in both the pre- and post-reform 
periods, constituting 75% and 87%, respectively. Finally, the average investment banking 
fee revenues of the firms employing the analysts are higher in the post-reform period than 
in the pre-reform period for both the full sample and star analyst subsample.  
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 3 show the same information for non-investment banks. 
Most of the summary statistics for the non-investment bank analysts are similar to those 
for the investment bank analysts with several exceptions. The average BOTACCU is higher 
for the non-investment banks than the investment banks in both sub-periods, indicating that 
non-investment bank analysts are less accurate than their investment bank counterparts. 
Regarding forecast optimism, RFOPT, non-investment bank analysts are relatively more 
optimistic than other analysts who followed the same companies, consistent with the results 
of Cowen et al. (2006). 
4.2 Logistic Regression Results 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the logistic regression (1), which are based on a sample 
of 21,834 and 5,290 analyst-year observations from investment banks and non-investment 
banks, respectively. Columns (1) to (2) of Table 4 show that the estimated coefficient of D 
is positive, suggesting that investment bank analysts, on average, are more likely to leave 
the profession in the post-reform period. The estimated coefficients of the STAR variable 
are significantly negative, suggesting that star analysts are less likely than their non-star 
colleagues to leave the profession during the pre-reform period. However, the estimated 
coefficients of the interactive term DSTAR, our main variable of interest, are positive and 
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statistically significant, suggesting that the increase in propensity of star analysts to leave 
the sell-side research profession after the reform is more than the corresponding increase 
for non-star analysts. The latter supports our conjecture that more star analysts left the sell 
side in the post-reform period, after accounting for the confounding events that affect both 
star and non-star analysts from investment banks. 17 
We obtain the aforementioned results after controlling for other determinants of the 
job separation, promotion, or demotion of sell-side analysts (Mikhail et al. 1999; Hong et 
al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Wu and Zang 2009). Relative forecast optimism, RFOPT, 
has little effect on the propensity of analysts to leave the profession. However, analyst 
experience, EXPERIENCE, significantly reduces the propensity to exit sell-side research.  
We also control for the sanctioned dummy in regression; however, the Global 
Settlement might have affected the 12 sanctioned banks differently depending on their 
business mixes. For example, a sanctioned bank may be more affected by the decrease in 
investment banking business and hence exhibit a higher departure rate. We allow for 
sanctioned bank fixed effects to control for unobservable heterogeneity across the 12 
sanctioned investment banks. We replace the sanctioned bank dummy with individual 
sanctioned bank dummies. The results (untabulated) for our main variable of interest, 
DSTAR, remain unchanged. We also re-estimate the regression model after controlling 
for the fee proceeds of investment banking business (IPOs and SEOs) and investor 
                                                 
17 In robustness tests, we use propensity-score matching to narrow down the non-star benchmark sample to 
make it more similar to the star sample. For each star analyst, we find two non-star analysts who have the 
closest propensity score within a caliper of 0.25 times the standard deviation of propensity score (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1985). We re-estimate equation (1) using this propensity-score matched control sample and report 
the estimation results in the online appendix. Our main inference continues to hold. This test helps to mitigate 
the concern for endogeneity, although it is hard to fully rule it out. In addition, we conduct one test to show 
that the results are not driven by any specific years. We add a dummy variable for each year, D2002, D2003, 
D2004, D2005, D2006, and D2007. The interactions between STAR and these dummies are consistently 
positive and significant (see the online appendix).  
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sentiment. As shown in column (2), neither LOGFEE nor SENTIMENT exhibits a 
significant effect on the likelihood of an analyst leaving the sell-side industry. 
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients of our variable of interest, DSTAR, remain 
statistically positive, suggesting that the key results are not attributable to these potentially 
confounding factors.18 If the aforementioned results for investment bank star analysts were 
driven by the loss of investment banking-related compensation, we would expect the 
reforms to have less of an effect on the exit of non-investment bank star analysts. We 
present the corresponding regression results in columns (3)–(4) of Table 4.19 As reported, 
non-investment bank analysts are generally not more likely to leave the sell-side research 
industry in the post-reform period. Furthermore, in contrast to their investment bank 
counterparts, star analysts at non-investment banks appear to be less likely than their non-
star peers to leave the sell-side research industry in the post-reform periods. The estimated 
coefficient of D×STAR is negative and significant.20 To formally test the difference in the 
departure pattern between investment banks and non-investment banks, we combine the 
two samples and regress the departure dummy on D×STAR×IB dummy, along with other 
control variables. The coefficient of D×STAR×IB dummy is significantly positive with a t-
                                                 
18 As our main variable of interest is an interaction term in a nonlinear (logistic) model, we follow the method 
of Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) to estimate the observation-specific interaction effects of 
D and STAR. The untabulated results support the hypothesis that star analysts have a significantly greater 
propensity to leave the sell-side profession in the post-reform period. We report this analysis for information 
purposes only. We do not tabulate these results due to the debate surrounding how to interpret the coefficients 
of interaction terms in logistic regressions (Greene 2010; Kolasinski and Siegel 2010).  
19 In Table 4 column (4), we exclude LOGFEE from the model because there is not enough variation after 
controlling for LOGFEE and thus, our main variable D×STAR is automatically dropped. 
20 In our setting, it mitigates confounding events that would affect all investment bank analysts over the 
sample period, leaving only the incremental effect of the regulation on investment bank star analysts over 
their non-star counterparts. Hence, if the dot-com bubble and a rising stock market in the late 1990s reduced 
the incentives for sell-side analysts to leave the industry, they would have the same effect on star and non-
star investment bank analysts. Similarly, the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the subsequent market downturn 
would make both star and non-star investment bank analysts more likely to leave the industry. In a robustness 
test, we find robust results after controlling for market return and investment banking industry revenue (see 
the online appendix).  
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value of 5.36. This finding lends further support to the conjecture that the reforms induced 
investment bank star analysts to leave the sell-side research industry. 
4.3 Effect of Investment Banking Business in an Analyst’s Core Industry on Propensity 
to Exit 
In the regression analyses above, we control for investment banking revenue. To strengthen 
our argument that the departure of star analysts is indeed due to investment banking 
incentives, we conduct two additional analyses. We consider that the level of investment 
banking activities in an analysts’ core industry has two effects on the analysts’ career 
choices.  
First, the post-reform period (2004–2007) coincides with a downturn in investment 
banking market activities. Hence, our findings that the likelihood and propensity of star 
analysts to leave the investment research industry increase after the reform may be 
attributable to the decreasing demand for their services after investment banking deals 
dried up shortly after the reforms. To investigate how the IPO and SEO markets have 
changed in the post-reform period, we extract the numbers of IPOs and SEOs and the 
corresponding proceeds from Thomson Financial’s SDC database for our sample period 
(1995–2007). Untabulated statistics show that IPO and SEO proceeds were low in 2002 
and 2003, but recovered in 2004 and surpassed the 1999 levels in 2007. The latter indicates 
that the increase in the percentage of investment bank star analysts who left the sell-side 
research industry in the post-reform period is not attributable to investment banking market 
conditions (although this might have been the case in 2002 and 2003).21  
                                                 
21 We note that this explanation would require analysts and their banks to work around the rule prohibiting 
research analysts from participating in investment banking businesses after the reforms (O’Leary 2007). 
Otherwise, investment banking market conditions should have no effect on the demand for sell-side research 
analysts after the reforms.  
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Second, we argue that star analysts are more likely to leave sell-side research after 
the opportunity to earn investment banking-related compensation is cut off by the reforms. 
If our conjecture is correct, we expect the reforms to have a more pronounced effect on 
analysts who are specialized in industries with a high level of investment banking 
activities.22 We test this implication by examining whether the level of investment banking 
activities in an analyst’s core industry is associated with the likelihood and propensity of 
analysts to leave the sell side after the reforms. We define an analyst’s core industry (based 
on the two-digit SIC) as the one from which the majority of the companies covered by the 
analyst come. We retrieve from the SDC database the IPO and SEO proceeds raised by 
companies in each two-digit SIC industry over our sample period and use it to capture the 
level of investment banking activities for each analyst’s core industry.  
We first report summary statistics on the percentage of departing star analysts by 
industry quartiles formed by ranking industry-level IPO and SEO proceeds in both the pre- 
and post-reform periods. Panel A of Table 5 shows that the mean proceeds for industries 
in the lowest and highest quartiles are $233 million and $22.478 billion, respectively, in 
the pre-reform periods. The corresponding figures are $509 million and $24.318 billion, 
respectively, in the post-reform period. During the post-reform period, the percentage of 
departing star analysts increases from 8.39% for star analysts from a core industry in the 
lowest quartile of investment banking activities to 12.96% for those in the highest quartile.  
In Panel B, we use an alternative classification scheme to obtain a more balanced 
number of star analysts in each industry quartile. Specifically, we classify the star analysts 
into quartiles based on the total IPO and SEO proceeds in the core industry of the analyst. 
                                                 
22 Industries with high levels of investment banking activities are also likely to exhibit high stock market 
activities, which attracts buy-side firms. 
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Similar to Panel A, we find that in the post-reform period, the percentage of departing star 
analysts increases with the level of investment banking activities in the analysts’ core 
industries. It ranges from 9.59% for star analysts in the lowest industry quartile to 13.41% 
for those in the highest quartile. However, there is no such pattern in the pre-reform period. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 further support our conjecture that the increased likelihood 
of star analysts leaving the profession is due to prohibiting the compensation of analysts 
based on a firm’s investment banking revenue. 
To test the effect of investment banking fee proceeds on star analysts’ career 
choices, we include LOGFEE and D×STAR×LOGFEE in logistic regression Equation (1) 
for the investment bank sample. The variable LOGFEE is defined earlier in Section 4.1. 
Table 6 presents the regression results. We find a statistically positive coefficient for 
D×STAR×LOGFEE in both regressions, suggesting that the relative increase in the 
propensity of star analysts to exit sell-side research increases with the level of investment 
banking fee proceeds from SEO and IPO activities. Overall, these results provide further 
support for our conjecture that the brain drain effect is associated with the loss of funding 
support from investment banking business.  
 
5. Career Choices of Star Analysts Who Exited the Sell-side Research Industry  
Although the results presented in Section 4 strongly suggest an increase in the percentage 
and propensity of star analysts to depart from sell-side research after the reforms, they do 
not address whether they are forced out due to funding cuts or leave voluntarily to pursue 
other opportunities. However, both are consistent with our conjecture that the reforms lead 
to a brain drain in investment banks. 
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To further investigate why star analysts leave the sell-side research industry, we keep 
track of all 259 investment bank star analysts and 21 non-investment bank star analysts 
who left the sell-side investment research industry during our sample period from 1995 
through 2007. We first use the I/B/E/S translation file to extract the initials and last name 
of these star analysts. We then look up the full names of these analysts from Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research and the corresponding issues of the Institutional 
Investor. Given their full names, we check Nelson’s Directory to determine whether these 
star analysts indeed left the sell-side research industry or were promoted to managerial 
positions in their firms or other sell-side research firms. Finally, we search Factiva and 
Google to identify the first job the departed star analysts took after leaving the sell-side 
equity research industry.  
Based on the information collected, we classify these departed star analysts into one 
of the following eight categories. 
(A) Promoted to a managerial position within the firm or at another firm. This category 
includes analysts listed as key executives in Nelson’s Directory of Investment 
Research. For example, Benjamin Bowler of Merrill Lynch was promoted to Co-Head 
of Global Equity Research. 
(B) Transferred laterally to a different department within the firm. This category includes 
analysts who stayed with the same firm after leaving the sell-side research industry 
(i.e., no longer found in the I/B/E/S), but are not listed as analysts or key executives in 
Nelson’s Directory. For example, Anatol Feygin of Bank of America Securities became 
the firm’s Head of Global Commodity Strategy.  
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(C) Moved to a buy-side, hedge fund, private equity, or venture capital firm. This category 
includes analysts who either moved to or started their own asset management, hedge 
fund, private equity, or venture capital firms. For example, William Julian left Smith 
Barney Citigroup in 2003 to become the founding partner of Calimar Capital 
Management, a hedge fund focused on small cap stocks.  
(D) Started their own investment research firm or moved to another research firm not 
covered by the I/B/E/S. For example, John Tumazos left Prudential Equity Group in 
2008 to found Very Independent Opinions, LLC.  
(E) Moved to a non-financial industry. This category includes analysts who left the 
financial industry. For example, Mark Rowen left Prudential Equity Group to join eBay 
as its Vice President of Investor Relations.  
(F) Retired or fired for cause. In addition to those who announced retirement, this category 
also includes a few analysts who were banned from the financial services industry (e.g., 
Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch) or fired for cause (e.g., Peter Caruso of Merrill Lynch 
was fired for tipping off clients).  
(G) Still a sell-side analyst but not found in the I/B/E/S. Some analysts are no longer 
covered by the I/B/E/S, but their names were found in the Nelson directory. Not all 
investment research firms are covered by the I/B/E/S. 
(H) Not enough information to classify. We were not able to find enough information on 
56 analysts to classify them into one of the preceding categories. This category includes 
these unclassified analysts. 
Table 7 presents the number and percentage of the departing star analysts in each of 
the preceding categories by sub-period. In particular, we are interested in investigating 
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whether the percentage of star analysts moving to these categories changed after the 
reforms and whether the change is consistent with star analysts moving to more lucrative 
careers. Elite analysts are known to leave the sell-side research industry to manage money 
as portfolio managers on the buy side (e.g., Groysberg et al. 2008). It is generally believed 
that money managers on the buy side can earn more than sell-side star analysts. This is 
especially true after the reforms, which prohibited tying analyst compensation to 
investment banking revenues (Institutional Investor 2007; O’Leary 2007; Pizzani 2009). 
Hence, we consider an increase in the percentage of departed star analysts who moved to 
the buy side as evidence that star analysts left the sell-side research industry to pursue more 
lucrative opportunities. We define the buy side to include asset management, hedge fund, 
private equity, or venture capital firms.  
Panel A in Table 7 reports the findings for departed star analysts from investment 
banks. Columns (1) and (2) show that a total of 108 star analysts left the sell-side profession 
in the pre-reform period (1995–2001): 17.6% were promoted to a managerial position, 
6.5% were transferred to a different department in the same firm, 24.1% moved to the buy 
side, and 14.8% moved to a non-financial industry. Columns (3) and (4) present the 
corresponding statistics for the post-reform period (2004–2007), and column (5) shows the 
change relative to the pre-reform period. Specifically, columns (3) and (4) show that of the 
151 star analysts who left the sell-side research industry in the post-reform period, 31.1% 
moved to the buy side, a significant 7% point increase relative to that in the pre-reform 
period.23 This is also the largest percentage point increase among the eight categories. If 
                                                 
23 Under the null hypothesis that the reforms have no effect on the career choices of star analysts, the 
percentage changes are zero. We assume that the percentage changes of these eight categories are drawn from 
a student’s t-distribution, with a zero mean. Hence, we estimate the standard error for statistical inference 
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potential compensation is higher on the buy side, this finding is consistent with star analysts 
leaving the sell-side research industry to pursue more lucrative opportunities on the buy 
side after the reforms. If star analysts were valuable for the investment banks in other 
capacities, the investment banks would make an effort to keep their star analysts by 
promoting them to managerial positions in the research department or transferring them to 
different departments with higher earning potential (e.g., investment banking or asset 
management). Panel A provides little support that investment banks are able to retain star 
analysts in this capacity. Specifically, the percentage of star analysts who were promoted 
or moved to another department (Categories A and B) increases by 1.1% which is not 
distinguishable from zero. 
To further support our conjecture that the reforms caused brain drain in investment 
banks, we perform the same analysis on non-investment banks. Under our conjecture, non-
investment banks should be affected the least. Column (5) of Panel B shows a significant 
13.6% reduction in the percentage of non-investment bank star analysts who moved to the 
buy side during the post-reform period. We also find a significant decrease in the 
percentage of non-investment bank star analysts who were promoted to a managerial 
position. However, the results presented in Panel B should be interpreted with caution, 
given the small sample of star analysts who departed from non-investment banks. In 
addition, non-investment bank analysts likely had less opportunity to move to the buy side 
because their performance is worse than investment bank analysts. As seen in Table 3, non-
investment bank analysts are less accurate and more optimistic than investment bank 
analysts. 
                                                 
using the standard deviation of the percentage changes across these eight categories. We also try more finely 
defined categories. The findings (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported here.  
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Taken together, the evidence documented in this section suggests that the sell-side 
equity research profession lost more of its star analysts to the buy side after the reforms. 
We attribute the brain drain phenomenon to the series of regulations that banned analysts 
from participating in activities related to investment banking.  
 
6. Potential Effect of Brain Drain on Investors 
Star analysts are voted by institutional investors each year and are considered to be the 
most valuable analysts in the profession. Their departure arguably suggests a loss of human 
capital in the industry. In this section, we examine one aspect of the value of star analysts, 
which can be measured directly with public data. Specifically, we investigate the adverse 
effect of the brain drain in the investment research industry on the investors who relied on 
the research of the departed star analysts. We compare the informativeness of research 
conducted by the departed star analysts to: 1) that of other analysts who covered the same 
companies and remained in the sell-side research industry; 2) that of the replacing analysts 
who followed the companies covered by the departed star analysts and came from the same 
brokerage firms of the departed star analysts. We measure informativeness by the three-
day market-adjusted abnormal returns, CAR(–1,+1), from day –1 to day +1, where day 0 
is the day the analysts revised their annual earnings forecasts, issued their stock 
recommendations, or issued industry research reports. 
In Table 8, Panel A summarizes our findings on the comparison of the 
informativeness of earnings revisions, stock recommendation changes, and industry 
research report issuance between departed and other analysts. We first regress three-day 
abnormal returns around earnings revision dates on DESTAR, an indicator variable that 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3243135 
30 
 
equals 1 for a departed star analyst, and the interaction of DESTAR and Revision, an 
earnings forecast revision variable defined as the change of forecast scaled by the last 
forecast made by the same analyst for the same firm. Column (1) presents the results, 
showing that the coefficient of the interaction term DESTAR×Revision is positive but 
insignificant. Column (2) of Panel A presents the results of regressing the three-day 
abnormal returns around stock recommendation dates on DESTAR, an indicator variable 
that equals 1 for a departed star analyst, and the interaction of DESTAR and RecREV, a 
stock recommendation change variable defined as the I/B/E/S recommendation upgrade 
from the same analyst. The I/B/E/S quantifies analyst recommendations from 1 to 5, where 
1 represents strong buy and 5 represents strong sell. Our RecREV is the negative value of 
the I/B/E/S recommendation changes. For example, if an analyst’s recommendation 
changes from 4 (sell) to 1 (strong buy), RecREV equals 3. The coefficient of the interaction 
term DESTAR×RecREV is significantly positive (0.616) with a t-value of 7.00. It strongly 
suggests that the market reacts more to the stock recommendation changes issued by the 
departed star analysts than to those issued by other analysts. The risk factors size and book-
to-market ratio are controlled for in both regressions. We further control for analyst general 
experience (EXP), firm experience (FIRMEXP), brokerage firm size (BROKERSIZE), 
number of firms followed (NFIRM), and number of industries followed (NIND) based on 
the earnings forecast accuracy literature (e.g., Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Lim 2001; 
Clement and Tse 2003). Taken together, these results are consistent with stock 
recommendation changes made by star analysts being more informative than those made 
by other analysts following the same set of companies.  
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To further support our argument that the departure of star analysts is a loss to the 
information environment of the firms they covered, we compare the informativeness of 
earnings revisions and stock recommendation changes of the departed star analysts to that 
of the replacing analysts. Replacing analysts are the analysts assigned by the brokerage 
firms to cover the companies that were previously followed by the departed star analysts. 
Not all firms covered by the departed star analysts have replacing analysts. In our sample, 
we find that 57% of firms eventually have a replacing analyst within one year, whereas the 
remaining companies suffer from the loss of analyst coverage. We do not explore the effect 
on the firms losing analyst coverage, but losing analysts in general is a negative shock to 
the information environment of firms being covered (Kelly and Ljungqvist 2012).  
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B present the results of regressing the three-day market 
responses on earnings revisions and stock recommendation changes, respectively. The 
significant positive coefficients of the variables DESTAR×Revision (with a t-value of 3.63) 
and DESTAR×RecREV (with a t-value of 2.09) suggest that both earnings revisions and 
stock recommendation changes issued by the departed star analysts are more informative 
than those of the replacing analysts.  
Overall, Panel B complements the findings in Panel A. Both panels provide 
consistent evidence that the departed star analysts are a group of better performing analysts. 
The loss of these analysts was a brain drain to the equity research industry. The number of 
departed star analysts might have been small, but it was a hint of a serious issue, suggesting 
that the regulations provided incentives to better performers to leave the industry.24 
                                                 
24 The departed star analysts do not have to be the best among all the star analysts for us to consider their 
departure to be a brain drain. We do find a stronger market reaction to the earnings forecast revisions made 
by the departed star analysts than by the star analysts who stayed on the sell side. However, we find no 
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7. Additional Analyses 
7.1 Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) came into effect in October 2000. The regulation 
eliminates the channel for many analysts to gain private information, so the potential 
confounding effect must be examined. We conduct two robustness tests to rule out the 
effect of Reg FD. First, we use October 2000 to 2001 as the pre-reform period. Second, we 
conduct a robustness test controlling for the education tie between analysts and managers.25 
Prior studies have suggested that analysts with education ties to managers have more 
private information (Cohen et al. 2010). If Reg FD is the main driving factor, we would 
expect that 1) analysts with education ties to managers would be more likely to exit sell-
side and that 2) our main results would be subsumed by this additional control (i.e., the 
coefficient on D×STAR turns insignificant). Our results are robust to these two alternative 
tests. 
7.2 Sample Period 
We end our sample in 2007 in the primary analysis because I/B/E/S provides translation 
files with analyst names only through 2006. We conduct several robustness checks with 
different definitions of the pre- and post-reform periods. In our first robustness check, we 
include 2002 and 2003 in the post-reform period. SOX Section 501 may have had an 
immediate effect on the career choices of star analysts, whose paychecks were significantly 
cut. Although the Global Settlement was finalized in April 2003, investigations into the 
                                                 
significant difference in the market reaction to recommendation revisions made by these two groups of star 
analysts (see the online appendix). 
25 We thank Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, and Chris Malloy for generously sharing their education tie 
data with us. The online appendix provides more details. 
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sanctioned banks started in June 2001. More importantly, in May 2002, the SEC approved 
amendments to New York Stock Exchange Rule 351, Rule 471, and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers’ Rule 2711. These new amendments placed stringent 
restrictions on analyst compensation and the relationship between research and investment 
banks. In our second robustness check, we exclude 2006 and 2007 from the post-reform 
period as analysts may have departed the sell side quickly. In our third robustness check, 
we exclude 1995 to 1997 from the pre-reform period to get a more balanced sample period. 
In our fourth robustness check, we include 2002 and 2003 but exclude 2006 and 2007 from 
the post-reform period as SOX Section 501 may have had an immediate effect on star 
analysts’ career choices. Our results are robust to these alternative definitions of the pre- 
and post-reform periods. 
7.3 Investment Bank Mergers 
We observe a decrease in the number of investment banks during the post-reform period, 
as seen in Table 1. There were 76 mergers in the financial industry between 1994 and 2004 
(Wu and Zang 2009), which partly explains the decrease in the number of investment banks 
over our sample period. To rule out the possibility that the drop in the number of investment 
banks explains analyst departures, we re-run the regressions using a constant sample of 
brokers over our sample period. The untabulated results show that our main conclusion is 
not affected by holding the sample of brokers constant. 
7.4 Voluntary vs. Mandatory Departures 
The departure of star analysts represents a brain drain in the sell-side equity research 
industry. These departures can be voluntary or mandatory. On the one hand, a decrease in 
compensation encourages high-ability analysts to exit the sell side to pursue other 
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opportunities. On the other hand, investment bank research departments can potentially 
terminate highly paid star analysts to cut costs. In the latter case, the number of companies 
followed per analyst should increase and the number of companies covered by brokers 
should decrease. Using our main sample and a constant sample of brokers, we find that the 
evidence is not consistent with the budget-cutting story. The number of companies 
followed per analyst (the number of firms covered per broker) decreased (increased) after 
the regulations were enacted (see the online appendix). However, we do not have data to 
entirely rule out the budget-cutting story (i.e., the new analysts may be paid a lower salary). 
Nevertheless, both voluntary and mandatory departures represent brain drain.  
7.5 Industry Reports 
The ranking of Institutional Investor (II) is based on industry knowledge, special services, 
earnings reports, and stock recommendations, with the first two attributes receiving 
increasing weights over time (Bagnoli et al. 2008). To the extent that II’s weighting scheme 
reflects what buy-side investors value from sell-side analysts, we examine the value of the 
sell side’s industry knowledge and special services. We do not have data on the special 
services provided by sell-side analysts (only a few studies have addressed this issue), but 
we have data on sell-side industry reports from I/B/E/S. We use the industry 
recommendations issued by sell-side analysts to examine whether departing star analysts 
have more industry knowledge. Following Kadan et al. (2009), we identify analyst industry 
recommendations from the I/B/E/S recommendation file. We find that departed star 
analysts are more likely than other analysts to issue industry reports. We also find that the 
market reacts significantly more to the departed star analysts’ industry reports than to other 
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analysts’ reports. This finding is consistent with departing star analysts having more 
industry knowledge than other analysts. 
The additional tests discussed in Section 7 are reported in the online appendix. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
We examine the effects of a series of regulations on the career choices of star analysts. In 
the post-reform period, we find a significant increase in the percentage and likelihood of 
investment bank star analysts leaving the sell-side investment research profession for the 
buy side. We suggest that such a movement is due to the decrease in earning potential at 
investment banks as a result of the reforms and that the regulations unintentionally cause a 
brain drain in the equity research industry. We also show that the forecast revisions and 
recommendation changes issued by the departed star analysts are more informative than 
those of the other analysts covering the same set of companies and the replacing analysts 
from the same brokerage firms. The loss of star analysts may thus adversely affect the 
consumers of these analysts’ research and the companies covered by these analysts. In 
summary, we provide the first evidence supporting the concern that the Global Settlement 
along with related regulations led to a brain drain in investment banks and the 
corresponding sell-side equity research industry.  
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Table 1  
Statistics on the number of equity analysts, securities firms, and companies being covered  
The sample consists of the analysts from investment and non-investment banks from January 1995 to 
December 2007. The sell-side analyst data are from Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S database. An analyst is 
considered a star in a particular year if he/she is on the Institutional Investor All-America Research Team 
list in that year or in at least one of the last two years. The investment banks are those listed as investment 
banks by Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research and identified as lead or co-lead underwriters by 
Thomson Financial’s SDC database. The non-investment banks include independent research firms, 
brokerage firms, and syndicate banks.  
 
 Investment Banks  Non-investment Banks 
 
Number of 
analysts 
(1) 
Number of 
securities 
firms 
(2) 
Number of 
companies 
covered 
(3)  
Number of 
analysts 
(4) 
Number of 
securities 
firms 
(5) 
Number of 
companies 
covered 
(6) 
        
1995 2,218 91 5,024  420 54 2,422 
1996 2,479 96 5,686  494 66 2,810 
1997 2,854 109 6,107  614 89 3,060 
1998 3,014 122 6,830  678 108 3,763 
1999 3,310 131 6,647  703 124 3,671 
2000 3,382 121 6,103  720 125 3,366 
2001 3,379 112 5,172  662 119 2,749 
2002 3,536 105 4,851  621 106 2,601 
2003 3,289 111 4,735  744 130 2,939 
2004 3,070 114 5,090  835 177 3,360 
2005 3,118 116 5,339  927 192 3,719 
2006 3,185 112 5,525  863 175 3,880 
2007 3,218 106 5,693  858 157 3,945 
        
Total 40,052 1,446 72,802  9,139 1,622 42,285 
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Table 2 
Statistics on star analysts who left the sell-side equity research industry by year and sub-period 
This table presents the number and percentage of star analysts who left the sell-side equity research industry. 
An analyst is considered a star analyst in a particular year if he/she is on the Institutional Investor All-
America Research Team list in that year or in at least one of the last two years. An analyst is said to have 
left the sell-side research industry in a particular year if he/she made earnings forecasts in the current year 
but stopped issuing forecasts the following year and if his/her departure is confirmed based on information 
in Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research.  
 
 Investment Banks  Non-investment Banks 
 
Number of 
star analysts 
(1) 
Number of  
departing 
star analysts 
(2) 
Percentage 
of 
departing  
star 
analysts  
(3)  
Number of 
star 
analysts 
(4) 
Number of  
departing 
star 
analysts  
(5) 
Percentage 
of  
departing 
star 
analysts 
(6) 
        
Panel A. Statistics by year        
        
1995 220 4 1.8%  10 0 0% 
1996 254 9 3.5%  14 0 0% 
1997 295 10 3.4%  13 0 0% 
1998 280 10 3.6%  13 1 7.7% 
1999 327 22 6.7%  11 2 18.2% 
2000 353 24 6.8%  10 4 40.0% 
2001 378 29 7.7%  9 3 33.3% 
2002 391 56 14.3%  12 2 16.7% 
2003 394 56 14.2%  17 2 11.8% 
2004 350 44 12.6%  17 2 11.8% 
2005 321 28 8.7%  25 4 16.0% 
2006 308 39 12.7%  26 4 15.4% 
2007 301 40 13.3%  21 1 4.8% 
        
Panel B. Statistics by period        
        
Pre-reform (1995–2001) 2107 108 5.1%  80 10 12.5% 
Post-reform (2004–2007) 1280 151 11.8%  89 11 12.4% 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of regression variables  
STAR is an indicator variable that equals 1 for analysts on the Institutional Investor All-America Research 
Team list in a particular year or in at least one of the last two years. TOPACCU (BOTACCU) is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 for analysts whose relative forecast accuracy scores are in the top 10% (bottom 10%) 
and 0 otherwise. Relative annual earnings forecast accuracy and relative forecast optimism, RFOPT, are 
calculated as described in the text. EXPERIENCE is the forecasting experience of an analyst and is defined 
as the number of years that analyst appears in the I/B/E/S database. BROKERSIZE is brokerage firm size, which 
is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the sell-side firm in year t. NFIRM is 
the natural logarithm of the number of firms the analyst follows in year t. NIND is the natural logarithm of the 
number of two-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the analyst is affiliated with a sanctioned investment bank and 0 otherwise. The sanctioned 
investment banks include Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J.P. 
Morgan Securities, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Global Markets (formerly Salomon Smith 
Barney), UBS Warburg, U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Deutsche Bank Securities, and Thomas Weisel Partners. 
LOGFEE is the logarithm of 1 plus the fee proceeds of the investment banking businesses (IPOs and SEOs) 
of the brokerage firm for which each individual analyst works. 
 
 Investment Banks  Non-investment Banks 
 Star analysts All analysts  Star analysts All analysts 
 
Mean 
(1) 
Std. 
Dev. 
(2) 
Mean 
(3) 
Std. 
Dev. 
(4)  
Mean 
(5) 
Std. 
Dev. 
(6) 
Mean 
(7) 
Std. 
Dev. 
(8) 
          
Panel A. Pre-reform period (1995–2001) 
STAR 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.34  1.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 
TOPACCU 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30  0.05 0.23 0.09 0.28 
BOTACCU 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.29  0.08 0.27 0.13 0.33 
RFOPT 0.01 0.35 -0.01 0.48  0.07 0.35 0.00 0.49 
EXPERIENCE 12.99 4.47 9.64 5.48  10.55 4.85 8.68 5.42 
BROKERSIZE 3.73 1.77 3.31 1.49  3.28 0.31 2.33 1.08 
NFIRM 2.81 0.52 2.39 0.74  2.56 0.59 2.35 0.83 
NIND 1.68 0.38 1.53 0.46  1.60 0.38 1.60 0.52 
SANCTIONED 0.75 0.43 0.40 0.49  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LOGFEE 6.09 2.22 5.27 2.23  4.90 1.19 3.70 1.59 
          
Panel B. Post-reform period (2004–2007) 
STAR 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.34  1.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 
TOPACCU 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.30  0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
BOTACCU 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.28  0.06 0.24 0.14 0.35 
RFOPT -0.02 0.34 0.00 0.48  0.11 0.34 0.03 0.54 
EXPERIENCE 16.67 6.51 11.39 7.63  10.22 6.92 9.68 7.62 
BROKERSIZE 3.68 2.02 3.47 1.51  3.48 0.44 2.25 1.13 
NFIRM 2.78 0.39 2.36 0.74  2.14 0.36 2.16 0.75 
NIND 1.60 0.39 1.41 0.46  1.18 0.30 1.38 0.50 
SANCTIONED 0.87 0.34 0.43 0.49  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LOGFEE 6.46 2.01 5.62 2.00  3.90 0.00 3.03 1.60 
Table 4 
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Logistic regressions of analysts who left the sell-side investment research industry 
D is an indicator variable that equals 1 in the post-reform period (January 2004 to December 2007) and 0 in the 
pre-reform period (January 1995 to December 2001). STAR is an indicator variable that equals 1 for analysts on 
the Institutional Investor All-America Research Team list in a particular year or in at least one of the last two years. 
TOPACCU (BOTACCU) is an indicator variable that equals 1 for analysts whose relative forecast accuracy scores 
are in the top 10% (bottom 10%) and 0 otherwise. Relative forecast accuracy and relative forecast optimism, 
RFOPT, are calculated as described in the text. EXPERIENCE is the forecasting experience of an analyst and is 
defined as the number of years that analyst appears in the I/B/E/S database. BROKERSIZE is brokerage firm size, 
which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the sell-side firm in year t. 
NFIRM is the natural logarithm of the number of firms the analyst follows in year t. NIND is the natural logarithm 
of the number of two-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the analyst is affiliated with a sanctioned investment bank and 0 otherwise. The sanctioned 
investment banks include Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J.P. Morgan 
Securities, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Global Markets (formerly Salomon Smith Barney), UBS 
Warburg, U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Deutsche Bank Securities, and Thomas Weisel Partners. LOGFEE is the 
logarithm of 1 plus the fee proceeds of the investment banking businesses (IPOs and SEOs) of the brokerage firm 
for which each individual analyst works. SENTIMENT is the investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
Standard errors are clustered by securities firm. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses beneath the coefficients. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical difference from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-
sided test. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Pr(Left Sell-Side = 1) 
 Investment Banks  Non-investment Banks 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Intercept 0.359 0.409*  0.683** 0.460 
 (1.460) (1.734)  (2.554) (1.421) 
D 0.147** 0.207**  -0.063 0.133 
 (1.968) (2.214)  (-0.430) (1.013) 
STAR -0.624*** -0.622***  -0.578*** -0.563*** 
 (-6.532) (-5.768)  (-3.451) (-3.314) 
D×STAR 0.909*** 0.956***  -0.232* -0.250* 
 (5.339) (4.846)  (-1.742) (-1.818) 
TOPACCU -0.444*** -0.434***  -0.588*** -0.591*** 
 (-7.309) (-6.189)  (-4.158) (-4.197) 
BOTACCU -0.341*** -0.305***  -0.264** -0.272** 
 (-5.604) (-4.301)  (-2.224) (-2.277) 
RFOPT -0.035 -0.070  -0.180*** -0.192*** 
 (-0.906) (-1.528)  (-2.652) (-2.780) 
EXPERIENCE -0.009** -0.012**  -0.016** -0.018** 
 (-2.166) (-2.499)  (-1.985) (-2.172) 
BROKERSIZE 0.189*** 0.137**  0.190** 0.189* 
 (3.251) (2.143)  (1.992) (1.937) 
NIND -0.159** -0.143  -0.074 -0.060 
 (-2.087) (-1.636)  (-0.551) (-0.431) 
NFIRM -1.101*** -1.116***  -1.042*** -1.052*** 
 (-17.073) (-15.642)  (-8.780) (-8.875) 
SANCTIONED -0.382*** -0.437***    
 (-2.905) (-3.106)    
LOGFEE  0.028    
  (1.447)    
SENTIMENT  0.124***   0.336** 
  (2.744)   (2.465) 
N 21,834 16,536  5,290 5,290 
Pseudo-R2 (%) 0.121 0.124  0.109 0.116 
Area under ROC curve 0.752 0.752  0.737 0.743 
Table 5 
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The relationship between star analysts’ career choices and the investment banking businesses of their 
core industries 
This table presents the number and percentage of star analysts who left the sell-side equity research industry 
for the quartiles classified based on the total proceeds of IPOs and SEOs. Panel A classifies the star analysts 
into quartiles based on the total proceeds of the IPOs and SEOs of their core industries. Panel B classifies the 
core industries into quartiles based on the total proceeds of IPOs and SEOs and assigns the star analysts to 
each quartile accordingly. 
 
  
Industry 
Quartile 
Mean Total 
Proceeds (million 
dollars)  
Number of 
Star 
Analysts 
Number of 
Departing Star 
Analysts  
 Percentage of 
Departing Star 
Analysts  
      
Panel A. Classify the star analysts into quartiles based on the total proceeds of the IPOs and SEOs of their 
core industries 
      
Pre-reform period 4 22,478 1,006 54 5.37% 
1995–2001 3 4,120 556 25 4.50% 
 2 1,102 270 8 2.96% 
 1 233 240 9 3.75% 
      
Post-reform period 4 24,318 733 95 12.96% 
2004–2007 3 5,702 237 17 7.17% 
 2 1,895 232 28 12.07% 
  1 509 143 12 8.39% 
      
Panel B. Classify the core industries into quartiles based on the total proceeds of IPOs and SEOs 
      
Pre-reform period 4 32,809 418 17 4.07% 
1995–2001 3 14,912 582 34 5.84% 
 2 4,640 522 27 5.17% 
 1 803 550 18 3.27% 
      
Post-reform period 4 38,459 261 35 13.41% 
2004–2007 3 18,321 369 53 14.36% 
 2 6,864 350 29 8.29% 
 1 1,337 365 35 9.59% 
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Table 6 
Effect of the investment banking business of an analyst’s brokerage firm 
All of the variables are defined in Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by securities firm. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses beneath the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical difference from zero at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-sided test. 
 
 Investment Banks  
 Dependent Variable: Pr(Left Sell-Side = 1) 
 (1)  (2)   
Intercept 0.321  0.262   
 (1.332)  (1.091)   
D 0.472 ** 0.527 ***  
 (2.375)  (2.660)   
D×STAR×LOGFEE 0.125 ** 0.133 **  
 (1.995)  (2.166)   
STAR -0.214  -0.166   
 (-0.790)  (-0.617)   
D×STAR 0.255  0.216   
 (0.690)  (0.595)   
LOGFEE 0.055 ** 0.054 **  
 (2.088)  (2.013)   
D×LOGFEE -0.065 * -0.062   
 (-1.698)  (-1.586)   
STAR×LOGFEE -0.074  -0.083 *  
 (-1.517)  (-1.689)   
TOPACCU -0.425 *** -0.427 ***  
 (-5.991)  (-5.995)   
BOTACCU -0.301 *** -0.301 ***  
 (-4.234)  (-4.211)   
RFOPT -0.070  -0.071   
 (-1.524)  (-1.547)   
EXPERIENCE  -0.012 ** -0.012 **  
 (-2.382)  (-2.486)   
BROKERSIZE 0.149 ** 0.143 **  
 (2.442)  (2.322)   
NIND -0.152 * -0.142   
 (-1.727)  (-1.624)   
NFIRM -1.115 *** -1.119 ***  
 (-16.010)  (-15.950)   
SANCTIONED -0.441 *** -0.442 ***  
 (-3.187)  (-3.165)   
SENTIMENT   0.122 ***  
   (2.633)   
N 16,536  16,536   
Pseudo-R2 (%) 12.4  12.5   
Area under ROC curve 0.751  0.752   
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics on the career choices of star analysts who left the sell-side research industry 
We identify the star analysts who left the sell-side research profession from 1995 through 2007 and classify 
their career choices into one of eight categories: (A) Promoted to a managerial position within the firm or at 
another firm; (B) Transferred laterally to a different department within the firm; (C) Moved to a buy-side, 
hedge fund, private equity, or venture capital firm; (D) Started own investment research firm or moved to 
another research firm that is not covered by the I/B/E/S; (E) Moved to a non-financial industry; (F) Retired 
or fired for cause; (G) Still a sell-side analyst but not found in the I/B/E/S; and (H) Not enough information 
to classify. We first use Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research to verify that the analysts have left sell-
side research and to check whether they have been promoted to a managerial position in investment research. 
Next, we search Factiva and Google to identify the first job these analysts took after they left the sell-side 
research industry. To compute the t-statistics, we estimate the standard error using the standard deviation of 
the percentage changes across these eight categories, assuming that the percentage changes from these eight 
categories are drawn from a normal distribution with a zero mean.  
 
Category 
Pre-reform period 
1995–2001 
 Post-reform period 
2004–2007 Difference 
 
# who left 
(1) 
% who left 
(2) 
 # who left 
(3) 
% who left 
(4) 
(4)–(2) 
(5) 
t-stat 
(6) 
 
Panel A. Investment banks 
A. Promoted 19 17.6  21 13.9 -3.7 -2.6  
B. To another department 7 6.5  17 11.3 4.8 3.3  
C. To buy side 26 24.1  47 31.1 7 4.8  
D. To another research 5 4.6  6 4.0 -0.6 -0.4  
E. To non-financial 16 14.8  20 13.2 -1.6 -1.1  
F. Retired or fired 9 8.3  14 9.3 1 0.7  
G. Not on I/B/E/S 6 5.6  1 0.7 -4.9 -3.4  
H. Lack information 20 18.5  25 16.6 -1.9 -1.3  
Total 108 100.0  151 100.0    
 
 Panel B. Non-investment banks 
A. Promoted 3 30.0  1 9.1 -20.9 -4.3  
B. To another department 0 0.0  1 9.1 9.1 1.9  
C. To buy side 5 50.0  4 36.4 -13.6 -2.8  
D. To another research 0 0.0  1 9.1 9.1 1.9  
E. To non-financial 0 0.0  2 18.2 18.2 3.7  
F. Retired or fired 0 0.0  1 9.1 9.1 1.9  
G. Not on I/B/E/S 0 0.0  0 0 0 0.0  
H. Lack information 2 20.0  1 9.1 -10.9 -2.2  
Total 10 100.0  11 100.0    
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Table 8 
Short-window market responses to earnings revisions and stock recommendations 
Panels A and B present the market responses to revisions of annual earnings forecasts and changes in the 
stock recommendations of departed star analysts and two groups of benchmark analysts. Panel A (B) includes 
departed star analysts and other analysts who followed the same companies in the year before the star analysts 
left sell-side equity research (analysts from the same brokerage firms who replaced the departed star analysts 
in the year after the star analysts left sell-side equity research). CAR(–1,+1) is the market-adjusted abnormal 
returns from day –1 to day +1, where day 0 is the date on which the analysts revise their earnings forecasts 
(recommendations). Revision is the earnings forecast revision deflating by the last forecast made by the same 
analyst for the same firm and fiscal year. RecREV is the I/B/E/S stock recommendation changes made by the 
same analyst for the same firm. DESTAR is an indicator variable that equals 1 for a departed star analyst. 
SIZE is the logarithm of 1 plus a firm’s total assets. BM is a firm’s book-to-market ratio. EXPERIENCE is 
the forecasting experience of an analyst and is defined as the number of years that analyst appears in the 
I/B/E/S database. FIRMEXP is firm-specific experience, which is defined as the number of years in which 
the analyst has issued at least one earnings forecast for firm i before year t. BROKERSIZE is brokerage firm 
size, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the sell-side firm in 
year t. NFIRM is the natural logarithm of the number of firms the analyst follows in year t. NIND is the natural 
logarithm of the number of two-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. The t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Other analysts 
 Dependent Variable: CAR(-1,+1) 
  REV=Revision REV=RecREV 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) 
      
Intercept -1.102*** -3.517*** 
 (-9.780) (-14.025) 
REV 2.531*** 2.026*** 
 (55.683) (67.835) 
DESTAR 0.131*** 0.636*** 
 (2.977) (5.889) 
DESTAR×REV 0.163 0.616*** 
 (1.157) (6.997) 
SIZE 0.099*** 0.278*** 
 (13.013) (13.757) 
BM -0.124*** 0.210*** 
 (-6.883) (5.260) 
EXPERIENCE 0.002 -0.102*** 
 (0.555) (-3.061) 
FIRMEXP 0.006 0.001 
 (1.470) (0.187) 
BROKERSIZE -0.037*** 0.046*** 
 (-2.910) (4.097) 
NFIRM 0.066** 0.091 
 (2.032) (1.239) 
NIND 0.009 0.106 
 (0.251) (1.056) 
N 318,980 57,076 
Adj R2 0.012 0.093 
 
Table 8 (Cont.) 
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Panel B. Replacing analysts  
 
 Dependent Variable: CAR(–1,+1) 
  REV=Revision REV=RecREV 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) 
      
Intercept -1.500*** -1.972** 
 (-3.264) (-2.336) 
REV 1.768*** 2.195*** 
 (7.924) (17.015) 
DESTAR 0.253*** 0.158 
 (2.727) (0.906) 
DESTAR×REV 0.943*** 0.309** 
 (3.632) (2.091) 
SIZE 0.098*** 0.189*** 
 (4.908) (4.757) 
BM 0.000 -0.302* 
 (0.731) (-1.797) 
EXPERIENCE 0.033 -0.343** 
 (0.456) (-2.483) 
FIRMEXP 0.001 0.016 
 (0.091) (1.061) 
BROKERSIZE 0.017 0.065*** 
 (1.572) (3.124) 
NFIRM -0.016 0.366** 
 (-0.160) (2.066) 
NIND 0.076 0.077 
 (0.713) (0.375) 
N 43,548 11,189 
Adj R2 0.012 0.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
